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Social work has absorbed and adapted major theories from related disci-
plines since its inception as an applied discipline over 100 years ago. These
positions have been used to construct its ethical underpinnings and its epis-
temological standpoint. In this chapter we revisit this activity and address
two questions: can we act as practitioners before we are fully cognisant
of the ontological and philosophical position informing our practice? Is it
possible to have a unitary, core ‘truth to act’ in light of the current globalisa-
tion of cultural norms, intercultural influences and challenges to intellectual
traditions as being patriarchal, colonial and monocultural? Social workers
must critically engage with philosophical and theoretical writings in order
to understand the bases and implications of their practice decisions. Equally,
however, a philosophy of social work must be dynamic, intersubjective and
dialogic, and propose that we co-create theory, knowledge and praxis with
our clients.
Why a philosophy of social work?
Social work has emerged as an international discipline and is now practised in many coun-
tries around the world: the International Federation of Social Workers claims membership
from at least 90 different countries (International Federation of Social Workers, n.d.). A
key question for the discipline now is what are the shared understandings about the world,
communities and individuals that allow social workers from Beijing, Buenos Aires, New
York, Durban, Suva, Mumbai, Helsinki or the remote Australian Outback to talk cogently
with one another? That is, what is social work and its praxis, and what, if any, shared un-
derstandings or unifying philosophy can be identified?
It is important to acknowledge at the outset that social work research and pedagogy
have been established on the foundations of European knowledge and worldviews (Sung-
Chang & Yuen-Tsang 2008). These worldviews have been enshrined in the dominant
language of social work knowledge discourse, English. In the postmodern era our dis-
cussions about social work must occur in the context of globalisation (Desai 2000). As
we write this chapter the definition of social work itself is being reviewed and revised,
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and this review acknowledges multiple knowledges and the existing hegemony of Western
knowledge discourses. The definition review acknowledges this multiplicity by encourag-
ing regional and even national amplifications of the international definition of social work.
Across the globe we can discern a common feature of social work in its drawing on
a number of interdisciplinary theories for its praxis (e.g. cognitive behavioural theories,
psychodynamic, ecological, general systems, etc.), which is often cited as a strength: we
take the best theories of other disciplines that are consistent with social work values and
ethics, and through praxis give them a social work ‘flavour’. However, the diversity of the-
oretical approaches to praxis can also be seen as a weakness, encouraging many theories
to exist side by side (Soifer 1999) without a framework for deciding what theory to use
when, and treating all theories as more or less equally valid. Fook (cited in Bell 2011) notes
that a philosophy of social work is necessary to establish a framework theory of theories,
in order to avoid an unsystematic eclecticism that might proffer contradictory approaches
to practice from equally contradictory ontological positions. Other attempts to explore a
uniquely philosophical position find social work scholars renouncing exclusivist logical
positivism and its research and practice methodologies, while at the same time recog-
nising the inevitable limitations and difficulties of an exclusivist postmodernism with its
multiple truths (Hugman 2003). Others have challenged the notion of having to choose
between positivism and postmodernism (Thomas 2004). However, in the marketised, ne-
oliberal funding and practice context that prevails throughout much of the world, social
workers are increasingly pressured by funders and governments into positivist research
and ‘outcomes-driven’ service delivery paradigms (Peile & McCouat 1997).
In an age of economic austerity, how can social work explain and justify itself, its re-
search and service delivery paradigms to funders and governments, let alone to each other
and service users? Unlike the creative arts, we cannot be satisfied with a position that says
that ‘we know it when we see it’. And in multidisciplinary practice environments such as
health and mental health care, how does social work explain what it does (and does not
do) to other disciplines and professions?
This discussion is an opportunity for social work not only redefine itself but to redefine
what we mean by ‘profession’ in light of what we ‘know’ to be true. While we do not
propose to take up the professionalism debate in detail in this chapter, we note that a fun-
damental characteristic of a profession is that it has a coherent (or systematic) science
(knowledge) and learning. However, as noted above, it has been repeatedly proposed that
social work lacks such a coherent philosophy, or theory of theories (Göppner 2012; Göpp-
ner & Hämäläinen 2007) necessary to engage in a critical discussion about itself as a
profession, and it is quite possible that a social worker, when asked to name a social work
philosophy, might find him or herself mumbling something about eclecticism, assuming
the doing (praxis) explains the thinking (theory) about what it does and why.
In order to explore a philosophy of social work, we need to set out a framework of
what social work is (ontology), what social workers know (epistemology), and how to as-
sess who we are and what we know. The development of a philosophy of social work would
go some way to providing cogent responses to questions about what social work is, what
it does, and why it does what it does, and the activities and issues with which it concerns
itself. This chapter is presented as a dialogue between the two authors as a way of teasing
out some of the difficulties and approaches to this topic, and by way of engaging in the
heuristic that we will propose.
Global social work
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What do we mean by philosophy?
C: I have always been intrigued by philosophy as much as I have been influenced by theory,
and the ideas it posited. This conversation is an opportunity to explore that interest and
its relevance to my current thinking about theory. Philosophers are interested in the ab-
stract, born from curiosity, a desire to understand something and articulate the logical
process of arriving at that understanding. Looking for principles that govern the flow of
ideas, philosophers are primarily concerned with rules of inference (i.e. each step of the
argument flows the laws of logic) and the conclusions drawn are then posited as true and
valid. This has been its practice since Socrates and Plato when rational science was her-
alded as the paragon of rational activity, as the way of knowing in the examination of the
natural world and this process of inquiry would also inform the exploration of the social
world. Essentially philosophy involves a premise such as ‘Pleasure is the ultimate good’ or
‘How do we explain evil if there is an all powerful loving god?’ (Epicurus) or with questions
such as ‘Can reason discover truth independent of experience?’ or ‘Are there limits to our
effort to know?’ To these questions propositions are posited which are then tested by logi-
cal argument supported by evidence, and conclusions are then drawn. While knockdowns
in conclusions are rare, the challenge is more likely in the beginning premise. So another
premise or question is devised and following the same logical formula another conclusion
is put forward. This framework is regarded as a benchmark against which all cognitive en-
deavours must be measured (Fay 1996). How it links with its aesthetic sensibility or affect,
and how that creed is coloured, expressed and portrayed to others, hint at a more complex
philosophy than its first beginnings. This is important when we look beyond the Western
philosophising to explore the more contemporary philosophy arising as a result of the con-
tributions from Indigenous and Eastern philosophers, feminist philosophers and critiques
from critical realists, social constructivists and multiculturalism.
It seems to me that people engage with philosophy and philosophical ideas to get
something out of it, so its significant contribution to social work is how it can be used or
applied. There is no inherent pre-determined path leading from philosophical ideas about
the big questions to ideas about how to achieve a particular end or outcome, e.g. how to
enact equality, justice, democracy, personal agency and ethical behaviours. It is left to the-
orists to take these premises and construct political, social, economic and cultural beliefs
(theories) around them that can motivate action or inform social practices or, in social
work’s case, a praxis from which to act. For example, how philosophy elucidates questions
like ‘What is virtue?’, ‘What is existence and its authenticity?’, ‘What is cause and effect?’,
‘What does it means to be human?’, ‘What is truth?’, ‘What is knowledge?’, ‘What is equal-
ity?’ and what is meant when we talk about wellbeing, peace and happiness is used to
inform political, religious, educational and social theories (to mention just a few uses).
Theories emerge to fill the gap between the philosophical and the contextual – the psycho-
logical, social, economic, cultural and political practices that are deemed to follow if the
premise is to be acted upon. When applied to social work this philosophical inquiry and
the actions that follow that inquiry have a particular resonance. My interest has led to my
exploring a philosophy of social work with the knowledge of 30 years of social work schol-
arship behind me. This is especially pertinent in the current changing environment facing
social work and the many ideas informing its practice as well as its desire to shore up its
professional standing.
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It is my premise that a philosophy of social work is important not only to identify
what social work is, but also what it is not, and what it does not do. Beginning with Plant’s
(1970) attempt to map the logical geography of the social and moral theory informing
social casework (the dominant method at the time) and Ragg’s (1977) philosophical analy-
sis of social casework which began the move away from the technical application of its
early beginnings to exploring its normative underpinnings, there have been spasmodic at-
tempts to articulate a philosophical position. Plant, Lesser and Taylor-Gooby’s work (1980)
explored the philosophical foundations of concepts such as welfare obligations, rights
of welfare and concepts of community, and McDermott’s (1975) collection of essays on
self-determination and related concepts on liberty, human equality, rights and right con-
duct, freedom and persuasion by philosophers and social theorists is still an important
reference. Clark and Asquith’s (1985) work on social work and philosophy discusses the
meaning and application of important insights from social philosophy including ideology,
theory and professional ethics. Each of these early works introduced philosophical debates
into the emerging profession’s discourse, resulting in the breadth of philosophical musings
explored here that have found their way into social work ontology. Social work needs to
think as well as do.
M: I accept wholeheartedly the notion that social work’s values and ethics are essential
elements in establishing what a philosophy of social work is; Popper acknowledged this as
an essential difference between the social and natural sciences (Stokes 1997). However, I
challenge the notion that ‘philosophy’ is some kind of ontological entity with which social
work must develop some kind of relationship. Social work is simultaneously theoretically
and praxis-based. Indeed, Payne’s somewhat confusingly named ‘modern social work the-
ory’ (Payne 2005) (which I think should be called ‘post-modern theory’) reminds us that
social work theory has moved beyond a catalytic, top-down heuristic, where social work
is done to clients, to a heuristic where clients are active co-creators of social work theory
and practice, together with social workers, and practice settings. Social workers above all
understand themselves as practitioners, whatever their area of work, and any social work
philosophy, however ontological, must be informed by its values and praxis.
C: Philosophical inquiry is not a static process and on reading philosophical works
one can spot all sorts of shifts in concerns that mirrored and reflected social changes of
the time. For example, philosophical ideas on what a good life is, what justice is, what
equality is, and even what society is, can be understood in terms of changes in society’s
rational expectations, as well as the changes resulting from the impact of sociopolitical
and cultural events (e.g. the emergence of Confucianism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Chris-
tianity and Islam, the influence of the European Renaissance and the Enlightenment, the
challenge to positivism, the critiques offered by post-structuralism and the rise in social
constructivism, critical realism and multiculturalism) (Garvey & Stangroom 2012, 370).
The feminist challenge to the hegemony of men dominating the world of ideas also gave
Western philosophy a shakeup. We need to take these developments on board. I argue for
a re-thinking of philosophy and its continuing usefulness to social work theory, practice
and professional standing because of the old Hellenic tradition of ‘there is something good
about argument itself, for the community and the individual’ is worth revisiting (Benton &
Craib 2011, 182). I think any discussion about the source of these ideas is essential before
undertaking any form of practice: which ideas and in what context are also important to
explore.
Global social work
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M: I agree with you completely that philosophy and social values are dynamic, and in-
formed by the social, political, economic and intellectual environments from which they
emerge. That is one of the challenges we face in social work. While until the last century
much of the development of social ideas happened relatively independently in different
parts of the world, with the advent of globalisation—technology that allows almost instan-
taneous communications of even the most trivial thoughts, the relative ease of travel, and
as you yourself put it, ‘the metaphorical shrinking of time and place’ (Noble 2013, 346) —
ideas spread quickly. Cultures are increasingly homogenised, and the domestic concerns
of a region quickly become available to the entire world. Yet the spread of ideas is not the
same as their adoption: the widely variant treatments of women, ethnic and cultural mi-
norities, sexual and gender minorities, and refugees and migrants, are examples of ways
the world holds on to its local tribalism. This means that any global social work ontology
must also take into account—or even privilege— indigenous and local epistemologies and
cultures, while at the same time engaging with them from the standpoint of social work’s
own values. You seem, however, to be suggesting that any philosophy of social work must
therefore be relativist, and that pursuing any one, unitary ontology is not going to be a
useful or productive undertaking. I can almost hear our readers and colleagues saying that
we’ve given up before we’ve begun. But a dynamic, dialogic, interactive ontology can be a
philosophy just as much as a static, unitary philosophy. In dialogue social work recognises
the dynamism that inheres within our epistemology and generalises it to ontology.
C: I am not sure I am arguing for or against one ontology as such but I am arguing for
social work to revisit the discipline of philosophy and its ontological underpinnings as well
as its premises when exploring theories for practice which determine how we act with and
for clients. Let me continue my case.
Social work is a human activity with specific ideas about social and human interaction
with its own aims, assumptions, values, morals and actions. Questions like ‘What is a good
life?’, ‘What does being human mean?’, and ‘What is society’ are the kind of questions so-
cial workers ask when being reflective about our discipline base and these questions are
philosophical in nature.
M: These questions are also highly contextual to time, place, and even person, and the
questions social workers ask are things like ‘What is a good life here and now, and what
does that mean to this person?’
C: Nevertheless, if being reflective about one’s practice and motivations, assumptions
as well as one’s beliefs, morals, ethics and values, and making them available to public and
private scrutiny and internal and external accountability is important for a profession’s in-
tegrity, then the discipline of philosophy is helpful. Further if we want to dig deep into
the core of social work’s knowledge base, its fundamental meanings, its core values, beliefs,
attitudes, knowledge, its priorities, and more broadly what professional bodies suggest
practitioners and educators spend time attending to and why, then philosophical inquiry
is an important disciple to help navigate this maze and its continual quest for answers can
help the profession be more systematic in this reflective investigation.
Understanding human nature and acting in the social, economic, cultural and political
arena has enormous consequences on the lived lives and aspirations of those who receive
the results of these interventions (individuals, families, communities, nation states and
the environment). For example, when social workers engage with people in their most in-
timate lives, making judgments, proposing alternatives, they are also making statements
about who they are and what their professional discourse is saying about the nature of the
1 Towards identifying a philosophical basis of social work
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world, about the nature of human beings and society, as well as about the nature of help-
ing and the assumptions about the helping process. More broadly their interventions also
say something about important concepts, i.e. ‘What is the purpose of living and being in
this world?’ and ‘What is important about their work and their position in it?’ which then
provides justifications about the what, why and how of social work’s involvement in the
lives of clients, in the framing of the policies and practices that impact on their wellbeing.
These interventions need to be more than whims; these actions need, in my opinion, to be
consciously informed by logic or analytical philosophy when applied in practice and ac-
cessible on reflection. The justification of each intervention or interpretation, judgments
made, policies formed, or what action or non-action has occurred must then by necessity
be made in moral, ethical, social, cultural and political terms within an ontological frame-
work which can be articulated when required, either in professional terms or individual
practice terms. Social work theories can provide a structured set of concepts that help un-
derstand the subject matter concerned, while philosophical reasoning can light the path of
cognitive inquiry. An engaged practice can be enhanced by philosophical reasoning.
Many social work theories rest upon the surface or insubstantial understanding of
the texts from which they are borrowed, so an ontological examination and discussion
of the intervention and sociopolitical, cultural and psychological consequences of these
theories is needed. A transparency of actions requires not only an understanding of the
rules of engagement associated with a particular practice theory but deeper more onto-
logical explanation of what is assumed underneath in the deeper meaning embedded in
these actions. Also, undertaking this examination provides opportunities for practitioners
and clients to challenge their assumed participation and understanding of this engagement
with the individual worker, the agency and the profession more broadly.
M: I agree that an ontological examination and discussion of the consequences of any
particularly theory is required. I hold, however, that this discussion cannot be held exclu-
sively amongst social workers as ‘experts’. These discussions must be inclusive of clients and
other stakeholders. Some of the resistance to the professionalisation of social work—and
even formal social work qualifications— is that in developing a philosophy, or theory or
knowledge base we have distanced ourselves from our grass, flax or bamboo roots from
which we have always derived our authority. Remember that even in the early Settlement
House movement the community was the expert, and the worker was the student of the
community teacher. This critique becomes moot, however, if we include those roots in our
discussions, and stakeholders become co-creators of theory in a particular context. That is
not to suggest that social work should ever abandon its values and ethics in that context,
but that through engagement all voices are heard and valued. I also acknowledge, however,
that this notion will challenge the notion of social workers as government functionaries
administering or enforcing government policies. That, in my view, is not social work, but
rather a catalytic, top-down administration of pre-determined policies and programs to
achieve pre-established outcomes.
C: Ideas are not identical or symmetrical to actions; indeed what actions and responses
are chosen can unleash a chain of unforeseen responses which then posit a whole range
of different reflections about that interaction and each person’s reaction to it and so on.
It seems to me that practitioners need to have considered the possible consequences of
their actions or at best have a firm idea of their intentions already framed by a philo-
sophical investigation. This questioning or philosophical investigation will consequentially
result in deeper questions than the insightful accounts of the rules being followed. Know-
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ing the technicality of what practitioners are doing should not obviate the need for a why
question. The why question involves deep reflections, rather than unreflective taken-for-
granted routinised or rehearsed responses. Many practitioners and scholars recognise this
process as involving reflection (Schön 1983). But in the philosophical sense it involves an
archaeological exploration, rather than a faithful descriptive account of actions or prefer-
ences which are often automatic and unreflective (Steel & Guala 2011).
M: What you are calling ‘archaeological exploration’ I am calling a dialogic, iterative
hermeneutic. Unlike archaeology, the social worker cannot undertake this excavation in
isolation: it must be interactive.
C: The practice of asking deep questions might, as Benton and Craib (2011) argue,
irreversibly alter the idea, position or practice in such a way that new investigations are
needed, hinting that engaging in reflection is not a smooth and uncomplicated process.
M: Indeed! It rarely is.
C: The much repeated adage that ‘Life is complex’ has resonance here. However, in
complex situations, social workers have to meet an immense variety of challenges and
demands, much of which requires ‘practice wisdom’. Practice wisdom entails acquiring
and testing a stock of routinised, casual knowledge, often not fully articulated, to be de-
ployed, but nevertheless deployed with great skill and competence. However, and here’s
the concern, at key moments when ethical, political, cultural and social dilemmas emerge,
roadblocks are encountered, ambiguities and contradictions are exposed; if there are gaps
between the doing and the thinking and being able to give an explicit account of what
was done and the embedded meanings, then a lot is at stake. Professional integrity, trans-
parency, accountability and efficacy are all up for questioning and challenge. This is where
an exploration of the genealogy of ideas can be influential in giving a public account of
practice and making it transparent for all to see.
M: Accountability is essential, and assessing the genealogy of an action or decision
(because it will be the action or decision and its consequences that will be scrutinised, not
only the idea) is important. I am simply suggesting that if a social worker reserves to her-
self the concept of expert knowledge then she will have disempowered the client (however
we construct that term). And if the client shares in the decision, then the client shares a
certain amount of responsibility.
Traditionally understood, philosophy is a way of living, or, in this context, working.
Perhaps we can now recognise that there is not just one way, but ways of living and
working. Wittgenstein wrote that rule-following only makes sense in the context of a com-
munity able to monitor applications of the rule; a successful rule is therefore exactly what
the community says it is (Gunnell 2009). In an increasingly globalised world, identifying
a consensus about what a single rule, or philosophy, or praxis, should be, exactly, would
be a daunting enterprise at best. Social work is above all relational: one cannot ‘do’ social
work on one’s own; it requires an other, or client, be that other an individual, family, group,
community, organisation or policymaking body. Perhaps the best we can hope for is that
our global social work community commits to ongoing dialogue about what a successful
ontology and praxis are in each context. This means that social work can and must de-
fine itself, and not be reliant on outsiders to define us. This would seem to put an end to
the issues that Flexner (1915) (who was not a social worker) raised a hundred years ago
about social work not being a profession because it did not meet his traditional criteria of
a profession. In addition, we have relied too heavily on validation from government poli-
cies to recognise who we are and what we do: regulation, for instance, must come from
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within the profession, not from external bodies. The management of risk, which is the
primary purpose of external regulatory bodies, only makes sense in a neoliberal, manage-
rialist environment. It is in this context that Dominelli (in Bell 2011) calls for a collectivist,
inclusive ontological foundation for social work, particularly in the marketised context of
contemporary practice. Where there is a robust social work environment, the social work
community, like any professional community, is very capable of regulating itself. Manage-
rialism, and its attempt to manage risk, assaults the autonomy and discretion of social work
and increases bureaucracy and control (Rogowski 2010). Multiplicity, diversity and dia-
logue are social work’s challenge to subordination to managerialism, which is a despairing
ideology; why settle for merely managing risk if we believe we can find solutions to social
problems?
An objective, unitary ontology is not only not likely in the applied social sciences, but
it is not useful: the interpreter, the interpretation, as well as the thing that is interpreted
are all in constant and dynamic relationship with each other. Wittgenstein stressed that
interpretation is an action that ‘hangs in the air along with what it interprets’ (cited in Gun-
nell 2009, 603). An iterative, dialogic, hermeneutic model of truth-seeking will be of most
value to the dynamic kind of social work which we recognise in the 21st century, where
the social worker, the client, and the relationship between the client and the work are all
in constant, dialogic relationship. This kind of dynamism will be frustrating, and possi-
bly make no sense to the positivist or ‘natural’ scientist. However, Popper proposed that
social sciences are different from natural sciences (Stokes 1997), and indeed rejected the
notion that reason can reveal the true nature of anything (Parvin 2011) because no-one can
foresee all the potential consequences of their proposals. The philosopher of science Al-
fred North Whitehead proposed that mutuality and interdependence are essential aspects
of an applied philosophy (Schmidt 1967): each occasion (or in our context, each interac-
tion) merges into the next natural occasion to create something new. Thus, all occasions
and relationships are perpetually made new through their encounters with other occa-
sions and relationships. It requires what Buber called a ‘Thou’ relationship with a client
(Buber 1958 [1923]). This conceptualisation is an excellent fit for social work, since social
work practitioners do not claim authoritative, expert knowledge, but allow ourselves to be
changed and transformed through our interactions with our clients. Our reflective practice
(Schön 1983) shapes and informs our practice philosophy, which in turn reflexively forms
a hermeneutic philosophy of social work. One of the models that comes close to this idea
is the integrated practice model (Keen & O’Donoghue 2005), which suggests that the prac-
titioner is in a relationship with self, and environment of the self, the other/client and the
environment of the other/client.
Why do we need a philosophy of social work?
C: So we agree that we need to engage with a philosophy of social work; it is how we define
what that might be and how we reach that end that we need to explore. Before we do that
I would like to make one last plea for a less fluid philosophy for these reasons. We need a
philosophy of social work because, while social workers have not been shy about adopt-
ing ideas from the social sciences and philosophers in the development of the professional
discourse, they have been adopted and adapted with, I would argue, only a surface level
analysis.
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For example, Chenoweth and McAuliffe (2012, 60–62) provide a summary of the main
philosophical utilities used in social work as the basis for its moral and ethical base, under-
pinning many of the current and past ideas that have formed the numerous social, political
and cultural theories and their epistemologies that have been adopted/adapted into its
scholarship and practice. This is important knowledge for us to know and adopt/adapt
to the situation but it is also important knowledge to be familiar with at a much deeper
level than contemporary social work scholars acknowledge. Parton and O’Byrne (2000)
and Aymer and Okitikpi (cited in Bell 2011) also advocate for a move from surface-level
theory to deeper exploration of these ideas; a distillation proffered by philosophy in terms
of exploring its underlying ontology, epistemology, as well as its logical, ethical, moral and
political implications. Without this deep engagement with the philosophical ideas in their
context and totality, social work theories and critical assumptions underpinning them are
buried so deeply that awareness is lost or never explored, risking (knowingly or unknow-
ingly) using theory and its application inappropriately uncritically and inconsistently. We
need a philosophical practice to unpack a whole lot of ideas obscured when simply put to-
gether in the form of a general matrix to guide practice (Beddoe & Maidment 2009; Bell
2011). Meaney (2001) argues that without a sustained focus on re-imaging the ontologi-
cal foundations of social work we risk building (more) elaborate epistemological facades
(cited in Bell 2011, 414). Indeed many regard the survival of social work as a profession is
dependent on getting its act together and beginning to seriously engage with its philosoph-
ical assumptions and making them explicit (Bell 2011). Indeed I would argue that social
work, in its uncritical grab of grandes idées and their uncritical absorption into social work
academic and practitioner discourse has also undermined social work efficacy nationally
and internationally. The project of getting a universally agreed definition of social work
could be seen as way of revitalising social works’ ontological position.
M: I agree that we social workers have largely adopted philosophical ideas somewhat
uncritically; that is a challenge to educators, however. Our task as social work educators is
to resist a model of social workers as technicians (which has been occasioned by the cur-
rent managerialist environment and the reality that in many countries government is the
largest employer of social workers) and ensure that social work students are thoroughly
grounded in philosophy and theory, and can engage critically with philosophy. We need
to place at least as much weight on philosophy and critical thinking as we do on field
placements. That, I think, would move us a long way towards greater parity with allied dis-
ciplines, and towards establishing ourselves as a profession. The tension is for us to do this
in a way that retains our praxis skill-set. Nevertheless, I suggest that this is not a philosophy
of social work, but an engagement of social workers with a knowledge base of philosophi-
cal traditions.
C: The task then, if we want to shore-up social work’s professional identity and
purpose in the current sociopolitical, economic and cultural context is to begin an re-en-
gagement with philosophy as a matter of urgent concern. So the question as to how to distil
or sort through the many philosophical explanations and their theoretical trajectories be-
comes crucial. In addressing this question we can see some progress; social work scholars
have come to align their thinking with notions of critical thinking and reflection, deep
questioning and thick description, transformative learning and interpretative analysis, cul-
tural evolution, social constructionism and relativism and multiculturalism, each with its
own corpus, though rarely acknowledged (White, Fook & Gardner 2012). How, then, can
social work save itself as a profession with integrity and applicability? The challenge is for
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social workers to reconcile possibly radically different ontological positions and articulate
its knowledge base situated within a panoply of social science and philosophical musings.
More importantly, is there a philosophy of social work that can lead its rescue?
M: I accept wholeheartedly the notion that social work’s values and ethics are essential
elements in establishing what a philosophy of social work is; as we’ve seen, Popper ac-
knowledged this as an essential difference between the social and natural sciences (Stokes
1997). However, I challenge the notion that ‘philosophy’ is some kind of ontological entity
with which social work must develop some kind of relationship. As I suggested earlier, I
think that a social work philosophy differs from a social worker’s engagements with differ-
ent philosophies. Social work is simultaneously theoretically and praxis-based. You seem
to be arguing that thinking comes first, then the doing and that the thinking must have a
logical and sustainable flow to it. I am suggesting that social work combines the thinking
with the doing and vice versa as an interrelated and relational exercise. This exercise is un-
derpinned by a process philosophy that is dynamic, interactional, relational and dialogic,
and in which ideas are only realised in its praxis, which also is interactive.
What does this mean for social work teaching and practice?
M: I think the way forward for us is to agree that there are simultaneously two discussions
which intersect with each other. Firstly, we have identified a discussion about social work-
ers’ critical engagement with an array of philosophical traditions and writings; the second
discussion is about a how to create a philosophy of social work. Both, I think, are necessary.
Social workers must critically engage with a broad array of philosophical and theoretical
writings in order to understand the bases and implications of their practice decisions. Crit-
ical engagement with something called ‘philosophy’ can place us on a more equal footing
with our professional colleagues in other human service disciplines, and move us beyond
merely being technicians, or implementers of manualised policies and practices. Here is
where social work will become a danger to neoliberal and managerialist policies; this is
something our Latin-American colleagues have known and understood for decades. En-
couraging this engagement is, in the first instance, a task for social work educators. Equally,
however, a philosophy of social work must be intersubjective and dialogic; a philosophy of
social work says that we co-create theory, knowledge and praxis with our clients. A philos-
ophy of social work is informed by our internationally agreed values and ethics, just as our
praxis must be grounded in a coherent philosophical framework. It is those agreed values
and ethics, together with our integration of those values into our practice, that allow social
workers from all over the world to have cogent conversations with each other. A philoso-
phy of social work is not a unitary ontology, nor does it need to be: a philosophy of social
work is dynamic, critical, and engaged with clients and the intersection of their multiple
environments, and the array of philosophies, values and ethics which inform us as social
workers.
C: Yes, let’s agree on this position.
Global social work
12
References
Beddoe, L. & Maidment, J. (2009). Mapping knowledge for social work: critical intersection. Melbourne,
VIC: Cengage Learning.
Bell, K. (2011). Towards a post-conventional philosophical base for social work. British Journal of Social
Work, 42(3): 408–23. DOI: 10.1093/bjsw/bcr073.
Benton, T. & Craib, I. (2011). Philosophy of social science: the philosophical foundations of social thought.
London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Buber, M. (1958 [1923]). I and thou. (2nd edn.) Trans. by R. G. Smith. NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
Chenoweth, L. & McAuliffe, D. (2012). The road to social work and human service practice (3rd edn).
Melbourne, VIC: Cengage Learning.
Clark, C. & Asquith, S. (1985). Social work and philosophy: a guide to practice London. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Desai, M. (2000). Curriculum planning for the history of social work. Indian Journal of Social Work,
61(2): 231–36.
Fay, B. (1996). Contemporary philosophy of social science: a multicultural approach. Oxford: Blackwell
Pub.
Flexner, A. (1915). Is social work a profession? Retrieved on 24 December 2013 from
www.socialwelfarehistory.com/social-work/is-social-work-a-profession-1915/.
Garvey, J. & Stangroom, J. (2012). The story of philosophy: a history of Western thought. London: Quercus.
Göppner, H. J. & Hämäläinen, J. (2007). Developing a science of social work. Journal of Social Work,
7(3): 267–85. DOI: 10.1177/1468017307084071.
Göppner, H. J. (2012). Epistemological issues of social work science as a translational action science.
Research on social work practice, 22(5): 542–47. DOI: 10.1177/1049731512442250.
Gunnell, J. G. (2009). Can social science be just? Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 39(4): 595–621. DOI:
10.1177/0048393109335330.
Hugman, R. (2003). Professional values and ethics in social work: reconsidering postmodernism. British
Journal of Social Work, 33(8): 1025–41. DOI: 10.1093/bjsw/33.8.1025.
International Federation of Social Workers (n.d.). What we do. Retrieved on 27 December 2013 from
ifsw.org/what-we-do.
Keen, M. & O’Donoghue, K. (2005). Integrated practice in mental health social work. In M. Nash, R.
Munford & K. O’Donoghue (eds), Social work theories in action (pp. 80–92). London: Jessica
Kingsley.
McDermott, F. E. (1975). Self-determination in social work: a collection of essays on self-determination and
related concepts by philosophers and social work theorists. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Meaney, M. (2001). Nature, nurture, and the disunity of knowledge. Annals of the New York Academy of
Sciences, 935(1): 50–61.
Noble, C. (2013). Social work and the Asia Pacific: from rhetoric to practice. In C. Noble & M.
Henrickson (eds), Social work education: voices from the Asia Pacific (pp. 343–66). Sydney: Sydney
University Press.
Parton, N. & O’Byrne, P. (2000). Constructive social work: towards a new practice. NY: St Martin’s Press.
Parvin, P. (2011). The rationalist tradition and the problem of induction: Karl Popper’s rejection of
epistemological optimism. History of European Ideas, 31(3): 257–66. DOI: 10.1016/
j.histeuroideas.2010.10.005.
Payne, M. (2005). Modern social work theory (3rd edn). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Peile, C. & McCouat, M. (1997). The rise of relativism: the future of theory and knowledge development
in social work. British Journal of Social Work, 27(3): 343–60.
Plant, R. (1970). Social and moral casework. NY: Routledge.
Plant, R., Lesser, H. & Taylor-Gooby, P. (1980). Political philosophy and social welfare: essays on the
normative basis of welfare provision. NY: Routledge.
1 Towards identifying a philosophical basis of social work
13
Ragg, N. (1977). People not cases: a philosophical approach to social work. London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul.
Rogowski, S. (2010). Social work: the rise and fall of a profession? Bristol: Policy Press.
Schmidt, P. F. (1967). Perception and cosmology in Whitehead’s philosophy. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
University Press.
Schön, D. (1983). The reflective practitioner. NY: Basic Books.
Soifer, S. (1999). Social work: a profession in search of a paradigm. Indian Journal of Social Work, 60(1):
50–56.
Steel, D. & Guala, F. (eds) (2011). The philosophy of social science reader. London: Routledge.
Stokes, G. (1997). Karl Popper’s political philosophy of social science. Philosophy of the Social Sciences,
27(1): 56–79. DOI: 10.1177/004839319702700104.
Sung-Chang, P. & Yuen-Tsang, A. (2008). Bridging the theory–practice gap in social work education: a
reflection on an action research in China. Social Work Education, 27(1): 51–69. DOI: 10.1080/
02615470601141383.
Thomas, P. E. (2004). Towards the development of an integral approach to social work: implications for
human behavior theory and research. Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment, 9(3):
1–13. DOI: 10.1300/J137v09n03_01.
White, S., Fook, J. & Gardner, F. (2012). Critical reflection in context: applications in health and social
care. Milton Keynes, UK: Open University Press.
Global social work
14
